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Abstract
Gonzalez (2007), JET, 137(1), 127-139, sets out a growth model with con-
flict in which households allocate their resources across consumption, and
investment in both productive and unproductive capital. A striking result is
obtained: there are circumstances where increasing property rights in society
can actually reduce social welfare and hence incremental changes are not nec-
essarily in peoples’ interests. This note reassesses this claim in a generalized
form of his model with a CRRA utility function (with a risk aversion param-
eter, σ > 1 rather than his logarithmic form) and we assume a less than full
depreciation of capital. Both these generalizations prove to be critical ones
that significantly change the result.
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1 Introduction
In Gonzalez (2007) a growth model with conflict is formulated in which households
allocate their resources across consumption, and investment in both productive and
unproductive capital, the latter for both offensive and defensive purposes. A strik-
ing result is obtained: there are circumstances where increasing property rights in
society can actually reduce social welfare and hence incremental changes are not
necessarily in peoples’ interests.1 This note reassesses this claim in a generalized
form of his model. In our generalization we employ a more general form of utility
function (with a risk aversion parameter, σ > 1 rather than his logarithmic form)
and we assume a less than full depreciation of capital.2 Both generalization prove
to be a critical ones that overturn ‘counterproductive increasing property rights’.
2 The General Model
The model consists of an intertemporal optimization problem carried out by a rep-
resentative agent i subject to their resource constraint. The agent at time t = 0
with infinite time horizon maximizes
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ci(t)) (1)
where ci(t) is consumption at time t and β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. The
instantaneous utility function is a concave and increasing function of consumption,
c, u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0. It is assumed that each agent in the economy has similar
preferences over the consumption sequence. Generalizing the Gonzales result, we
assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form of the utility function
u(c) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ
; σ > 1
= log(c); σ = 1 (2)
1For additional discussion of the Gonzalez results see for instance Garfinkel and Skaperdas
(2007) and Ray (2007).
2The growth, RBC and DSGE model literatures suggest values σ ∈ [1.5, 3] and δ ∈ [0.1, 0.2] on
an annual basis.
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Agent i allocates their output among consumption at time t, ci(t) and invest-
ment in next period’s stocks of capital of which ki(t + 1) is productive; xi(t + 1)
is unproductive and defensive; and zi(t+ 1) is unproductive and offensive. Assume
that k(0) > 0, x(0) > 0, z(0) > 0 and that the productive, defensive and offensive
capital depreciate at rates δk, δx and δz respectively. The gross investment at time
t for each capital is then defined as: ki(t+1)− (1− δk)ki(t), xi(t+1)− (1− δx)xi(t)
and zi(t+ 1)− (1− δz)zi(t).
A stock of productive capital, ki(t) produces output, Aki(t) and economy’s av-
erage output, Ak(t). With appropriation, agent i retains only pi(t)Aki(t). Agent
i can also lay claim to a proportion qi(t) of society’s average output y(t) = Ak(t),
proportions pi(t) and qi(t) are given below. Under imperfect property rights, the
net output of agent i is given by:
yi(t) = A(pi(t)ki(t) + qi(t)k(t))
With A > 0, households supply a fixed amount of labour, L, and productive capital
per head is ki(t) ≡
K(t)
L
. Output is only a function of capital and linear in productive
capital, ki(t). The production function has some important characteristics to note:
there is no diminishing returns to capital with a constant marginal product of capital
equal to A.3
Proportions pi(t) and qi(t) are given by ratio forms of the contest success func-
tions (CSF):4
pi(t) =
pi(xi(t))
m
pi(xi(t))m + (z(t))m
=
1
1 + 1
pi
(
z(t)
xi(t)
)m (3)
qi(t) =
(zi(t))
m
pi(x(t))m + (zi(t))m
=
1
1 + pi
(
x(t)
zi(t)
)m (4)
where 1 ≤ pi <∞ ensures that defence of property claims is more effective than the
challenge of other agents’ claims. In the context of the model here, the parameter pi
3It is this assumption that allows technology to be the engine of continuous economic growth.
4Two forms of the CSF, discussed in Hirshleifer (2000) at some length, are the ratio form and
the difference form. General forms of the CSF discussed in Skaperdas (1996).
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captures property rights: pi = 1 would imply that there is no differentiation between
defensive and offensive activities. As pi → ∞ then pi(t) → 1 and qi(t) → 0 and
with pi → ∞ then pi(t) → 1 and qi(t) → 0. In other words, property rights are
guaranteed and we arrive at the standard economic model. Then in the absence of
appropriative or defensive activities a stock of productive capital ki(t) accumulated
at time t produces output yi(t) = Aki(t).
The parameter m in (3) and (4) is the decisiveness parameter scaling the degree
to which a side’s greater strength translates into enhanced appropriation success.
Following Gonzalez, we assume 0 ≤ m ≤ 1 ruling out increasing returns to scale
from non-productive activities.
3 The Optimization Problem and Equilibrium
Thus, the resource constraint for agent i is given by
yi(t) = A(pi(t)ki(t) + qi(t)k(t)) ≥ ci(t) + ki(t+ 1)− (1− δk)ki(t) + xi(t+ 1)
− (1− δx)xi(t) + zi(t+ 1)− (1− δz)zi(t) (5)
At time t = 0, each agent is endowed with stocks of productive, k(0) > 0 and
unproductive capital, x(0) > 0 and z(0) > 0. Taking other agents decision as given,
agent i then chooses allocations {ci(t)}, {ki(t)}, {xi(t)} and {zi(t)} to maximize (1)
subject to the resource constraint (5).
To solve the optimization problem of agent i let λi(t) denote the Lagrangian
multiplier and form the Lagrangian:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt[u(ci(t)) + λi(t)(A(pi(t)ki(t) + qi(t)k(t))− ci(t)
− ki(t+ 1) + (1− δk)ki(t)− xi(t+ 1) + (1− δx)xi(t)− zi(t+ 1) + (1− δz)zi(t))]
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The first-order conditions are
ci(t)
−σ = λi(t) (6)
β(Api(t) + 1− δk) = β
(
A
∂pi(t)
∂xi(t)
ki(t) + 1− δx
)
= β
(
A
∂qi(t)
∂zi(t)
k(t) + 1− δz
)
=
λi(t− 1)
λi(t)
(7)
yi(t) = A(pi(t)ki(t) + qi(t)k(t)) = ci(t) + ki(t+ 1)− (1− δk)ki(t) + xi(t+ 1)
− (1− δx)xi(t) + zi(t+ 1)− (1− δz)zi(t) (8)
From (6), the Lagrangian multiplier, λi(t) is equal to the marginal utility of con-
sumption. Hence, the extra utility from additional unit of consumption “today” is
the opportunity cost of forgone productive or defensive or offensive capital. Equation
(7) equates the marginal benefit of appropriative and defensive investment in con-
sumption units with the utility opportunity costs in the previous period. Equation
(8) is the binding resource constraint.
Given the CSFs, the partial derivative with respect to xi(t) and zi(t) are
∂pi
∂xi
=
m
xi
(
pixmi
pixmi + z
m
)(
zm
pixmi + z
m
)
=
m
xi
pi(1− pi) (9)
∂qi
∂zi
=
m
zi
(
zmi
pixm + zmi
)(
pixm
pixm + zmi
)
=
m
zi
qi(1− qi) (10)
which now completely characterizes the equilibrium.
We now seek a symmetric balanced growth steady state with δk = δx = δz = δ,
ki(t) = k(t), xi(t) = x(t) and zi(t) = z(t) and
c(t+1)
c(t)
= k(t+1)
k(t)
= x(t+1)
x(t)
= z(t+1)
z(t)
=
1 + γ where γ is the continuous growth rate yet to be determined. Imposing these
properties on the first order conditions we arrive at the equilibrium
c(t+ 1)
c(t)
=
k(t+ 1)
k(t)
=
y(t+ 1)
y(t)
= (1 + γ) = [β(Ap(pi) + 1− δ)]
1
σ (11)
x(t) = z(t) = m(1− p(pi))k(t) (12)
p(pi) =
pi
1 + pi
(13)
c(t) = [A− (1 + 2m(1− p(pi)))(γ + δ)]k(t) (14)
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given the initial condition k(t) = k(0) at t = 0. It is easily verified that if σ = 1 and
δ = 1 this equilibrium reduces to that of Gonzalez.
For use later are savings rates
sk =
1
A
(γ + δ) (15)
sx = sz =
m(1− p(pi))
A
(γ + δ) (16)
where sk ≡ ki(t+1)−(1−δ)ki(t)
Aki(t)
, sx and sz, defined analogously are the savings rates for
productive, unproductive defensive and unproductive offensive capital respectively.
If δ = 1 and σ = 1, the growth rate becomes, βp(pi)A− 1, which is the growth
rate in Gonzalez. Since p ≥ 1
2
for pi ≥ 1, the sufficient condition for positive growth
is that βA > 2. Further, if pi → ∞ and p(pi) → 1 we arrive at the standard
endogenous growth model growth rate outcome under perfect property rights. If
∞ > pi > 1 and thus 1
2
< p(pi) < 1, the growth rate under imperfect property rights
is always less than the growth rate under perfect property rights.
4 Property Rights and Social Welfare
For σ = 1 and δ = 1, Gonzalez asserts that a gradual piecemeal increment in
property rights (pi) does not always improve welfare. Formally he shows:
Proposition 1
If σ = δ = 1, for relatively very high values of m and β there exists a sequence (a, b),
and pi ∈ (a, b) ⊂ [1,∞) such that even though property rights are improving and
positive growth is assured, the utility of agent i declines for pi ∈ (a, b).
Proof. See Appendix A.
As Gonzalez states , this proposition defines a sequence in which there exist an
interior equilibrium, for all pi ∈ [1,∞) but for some pi utility is decreasing. The
graphs labelled σ = 1 in figure 1 illustrates the Gonzalez proposition as m increases
from m = 0.1 to m = 0.97 and parameter values are otherwise as in his paper.
The intuition for this result can be seen by considering the two effects of better
property rights and therefore higher growth on welfare. First the higher savings
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entailed means that current consumption c(0) falls as can be seen from (A.3). This
negative effect on welfare is offset by the positive from the increase in growth.
The condition (A.2) is for the latter growth effect to outweigh the former current
consumption effect. For the perfect property rights case as pi → ∞ and p(pi) → 1
we have that
dU
dp
= [(1 + γ)σ − β(1 + γ)] 2m(γ + δ) (17)
Since β < 1, for σ ≥ 1 (17) is positive. Thus for the perfect property rights model
the welfare effect of higher growth is (not unsurprisingly) positive.
As property rights are eroded the unambiguously positive effect of growth on
welfare breaks down as shown in proposition 1 for the restrictive case of σ = δ = 1.
The reason is that higher growth increases inefficient non-productive investment and
may no longer offset the current consumption effect. However this effect is crucially
dependent on the choice of the risk-aversion parameter σ and depreciation rate δ.
First we can show:
Proposition 2
For δ=1, there exists a σ = σ∗ > 1 such that for any p ∈ [1
2
, 1] we have dU
dp
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The graphs labelled σ = 1.01 and σ = 1.1 show how sensitive the welfare-p relation-
ship is to small increases in σ and that σ∗ need only to be slightly over unity for a
monotone relationship to emerge.
Next we put σ = 1 and examine δ < 1. Then we have the proposition:
Proposition 3
For σ=1, there exists a δ = δ∗ < 1 such that for any p ∈ [1
2
, 1] we have dU
dp
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 2 shows the case where δ ∈ (0, 1) and σ = 1 and again illustrates how
sensitive the Gonzalez result is to small deviations from δ = 1.
The intuition behind propositions 2 and 3 is somewhat the same as the propo-
sition 1. In what follows, the rates of savings for each capital increase in δ and γ
but γ decreases in σ and δ. Therefore, in proposition 2, the increase in σ causes the
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growth rate, γ to fall, this means the future productive savings also falls but the
most important implication is that the returns to defensive and offensive activities
are also falling. There is, in fact, a further effect of fall in savings rates that is the
current consumption rises. Whereas, in proposition 3, even though the effect of the
fall in δ increases growth rate, γ, and hence this increases saving rates, there is a di-
rect and greater effect of δ on savings rates. Formally, taking the partial derivatives
of (15) and (16) with respect to δ it is easy to verify that;
∂sk
∂δ
=
1
A
(1− β) and
∂sx
∂δ
=
∂sz
∂δ
=
m(1− p(pi))
A
(1− β)
Hence since β < 1, the net effect of fall in δ is that it reduces the savings rates and
hence the welfare effects of non-productive investment.
5 Conclusions
Our extension of the Gonzalez model shows that the Gonzalez findings do not hold
for ∀ σ > 1 and for ∀ δ ∈ [0, 1]. With δ = 1, for as low a value as σ = 1.1,
figure 1 indicates that a small increment in property rights has a positive effect on
utility throughout. Similarly with σ = 1, for as high a value as δ = 0.8 in figure
2 the monotone welfare-property rights relationship emerges. The Gonzalez result
in other words is crucially dependent on the assumptions of a logarithmic utility
function in consumption and complete depreciation of capital.
References
Garfinkel, M. R. and Skaperdas, S. (2007). Economics of Conflict: An Overview,
volume 2 of Handbook of Defense Economics, chapter 22, pages 649–709. Elsevier.
Gonzalez, F. M. (2007). Effective property rights, conflict and growth. Journal of
Economic Theory, 137(1), 127–139.
7
Hirshleifer, J. (2000). The macrotechnology of conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolu-
tion, 44(6), 773–792.
Ray, D. (2007). Introduction to development theory. Journal of Economic Theory,
137(1), 1–10.
Skaperdas, S. (1996). Contest success functions. Economic Theory, 7, 283–90.
A Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1
In order to analyze this claim under the extended model the utility function is
re-examined. Putting c(t) = (1 + γ)c(t− 1) = (1 + γ)tc(0) we obtain
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c(t)1−σ − 1
1− σ
]
=
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
((1 + γ)tc(0))1−σ
1− σ
−
1
1− σ
]
=
1
(1− σ)
[
c(0)1−σ
1− β(1 + γ)1−σ
−
1
1− β
]
(A.1)
which is valid if and only if β(1 + γ)1−σ < 1. For σ ≥ 1 this clearly holds for γ > 0
and β < 1.
To evaluate at σ = 1 (the Gonzalez Case) we apply L’Hopital’s rule to obtain
lim
σ→1
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(1 + γ)tc(0)1−σ
1− σ
− 1
]
=
1
1− β
log(c(0)) +
β
(1− β)2
log(1 + γ)
We now examine the conditions for welfare to increase monotonically or not
as property rights captured by the parameter pi increase; i.e, the conditions under
which dU
dpi
= dU
dp(pi)
≥ 0. First note that
dU
dpi
=
dU
dp(pi)
dp(pi)
dpi
where dp(pi)
dpi
> 0 ∀ pi ∈ [1,∞). Hence, considering the condition dU
dp(pi)
≥ 0 will suffice.
We then have that
dU
dp(pi)
=
d
(
1
(1−σ)
(
c(0)1−σ
1−β(1+γ)1−σ
− 1
1−β
))
dp(pi)
≥ 0
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if and only if
[(1 + γ)σ − β(1 + γ)]
dc(0)
dp(pi)
+ βc(0)
dγ
dp(pi)
≥ 0 (A.2)
noting from the equilibrium in section 3 above that
dc(0)
dp(pi)
=
[
2m(γ + δ)−
1
σ
[1 + 2m(1− p(pi))][β(p(pi)A+ 1− δ)]
1−σ
σ βA
]
k(0)
dγ
dp(pi)
= βA
1
σ
[β(p(pi)A+ 1− δ)]
1−σ
σ
c(0) = [A− (1 + 2m(1− p(pi)))(γ + δ)]k(0) (A.3)
Next we evaluate the condition at σ = 1 and δ = 1 to give
dc(0)
dp(pi)

σ=1,δ=1
= [2m(βAp(pi))− [1 + 2m(1− p(pi))]βA] k(0)
dγ
dp(pi)

σ=1,δ=1
= βA
Substituting these into (A.2) and assuming σ = 1 and δ = 1, the Gonzalez proposi-
tion (1) is verified by solving the following condition for (A.2) to hold:
p(pi)[1 + 2m(1− (2− β)p(pi))] ≤ 1
The left hand side is quadratic in p(pi) and the condition fails at some p(pi) < 1 if
m >
1
2
and
(1 + 2m)2
8m
> 2− β
which completes the proof.5
Proposition 2
Rearranging (A.2) for δ = 1 we now have
dU
dp
= [(1 + γ)σ − β(1 + γ)] 2m(γ + 1) +
(βA)2
σ
(1 + γ)1−σ[1− p(1 + 2m(1− p))]
≡ F (σ, p) +G(σ, p) (A.4)
Clearly F (σ, p) ≡ [(1 + γ)σ − β(1 + γ)] 2m(γ + δ) > 0 for all σ ≥ 1. Furthermore
putting (1 + γ)σ = βAp:
G(σ, p) ≡
(βA)2
σ
(βAp)
1−σ
σ (1− p(1 + 2m(1− p)))
5For m = 1 the condition for dU
dp
< 0 at some p(pi) < 1 becomes β > 7
8
.
9
which is negative if (1 − p(1 + 2m(1 − p))) < 0. For low levels of m this does not
occur for any p and dU
dp
> 0 for all σ and p. But for m = 1 and p = 3
4
, G(σ, p) < 0.
For the latter case it is clear that −G(σ, p) is downward sloping in σ and tends to
zero as σ →∞ as illustrated in figure 3. This proves the proposition.
Proposition 3
Rearranging (A.2) for σ = 1
dU
dp
= 2m(1− β)(1 + γ)(γ + δ) + (βA)2 − (βA)2p(pi)(1 + 2m(1− p(pi)))
≡ H(δ, p) +K(p) (A.5)
where H(δ, p) ≡ 2m(1−β)(1+γ)(γ+ δ)+(βA)2 > 0 ∀δ and downward sloping in δ,
and K(p) ≡ −(βA)2p(pi)(1 + 2m(1− p(pi)) < 0. Consider a value of p(pi) for which
at δ = 1 the Gonzalez result dU
dp
< 0 is obtained, as in figure 4. The proposition now
follows.
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Figure 1: Utility and Property Rights with δ = 1: A = 2.3, β = 0.9 and k(0) = 1.
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Figure 2: Utility and Property Rights with σ = 1 : A = 2.3, β = 0.9 and k(0) = 1.
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Figure 3: F (σ, p) and −G(σ, p): A = 2.3, β = 0.9, m = 1 and p = 3/4.
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Figure 4: H(δ, p) and −K(p): A = 2.3, β = 0.9, m = 1 and p = 3/4.
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